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PARADISE LOST BUT RECAPTURED: PROSECUTION
HISTORY ESTOPPEL WEAKENED IN WARNER-JENKINSON
CO. V HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO.
JEREMY E. NOE*
INTRODUCTION
[Competitors] may understand what is the scope of the patent
owner's rights by obtaining the patent and prosecution history-
'the undisputed public record.
'
Less than two years after the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") confidently asserted in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. that the public record of a
patent enabled clear understanding of that patent's scope, the United
States Supreme Court endangered that assertion in Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.2 Among its many unsatisfactory
statements purporting to clarify patent infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents, the Court in Warner-Jenkinson announced that
patentees could rebut the presumption that prosecution history es-
toppel applies.3 This announcement heightens the anxieties of the
public and the patent bar by making it even more difficult to deter-
mine the reach of a patent's scope. By creating a rebuttable prosecu-
tion history estoppel presumption, the Court enables claim bounda-
ries already made elastic by the doctrine of equivalents to stretch
even further.
Those confronting a charge of patent infringement now face
enormous potential liability.! The Supreme Court's creation of a re-
* J.D. Candidate 2000, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S.Ch.E. 1984, University of Illi-
nois. I thank Professor Kimberly Pace for her helpful guidance and review in preparing this ar-
ticle.
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting
Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 819 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1989), affd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
2. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
3. See id. at 1051.
4. See, e.g., SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Lab., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (affirming a $35 million damages award); Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543,
1547, 1556 (Fed. Cir.) ($103 million damages award), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 266 (1997); Verdicts
and Settlements: Unocal's Patent Claims Stand Up Against Rivals, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at
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buttable presumption that prosecution history estoppel applies actu-
ally weakens, not strengthens, the ability to successfully defend
against patent infringement allegations. This ruling unfairly shifts
toward the patentee the balance between protecting a patentee's in-
terests and providing notice to the public.
This comment focuses on the conflict between protecting a pat-
entee's interests and providing the public with clear notice regarding
the limits of an invention. Part I frames the issue of patent infringe-
ment, briefly discussing patent law statutory provisions and outlining
the doctrine of equivalents and its traditional limitations, with focus
on the history of prosecution history estoppel. Part I also discusses
claim construction, an activity closely linked to determining the scope
of prosecution history estoppel.
Part II discusses the Supreme Court's recent Warner-Jenkinson
decision, centering on the Court's announcement of a rebuttable pre-
sumption that prosecution history estoppel applies. Part II also dis-
cusses the Federal Circuit's treatment of Warner-Jenkinson upon re-
mand.
Finally, Part III discusses the undesirable aspects of the Court's
rebuttable presumption rule regarding prosecution history estoppel.
This Part argues that the Court's ruling will chill future technology
development. It also argues that the doctrine of equivalents as it op-
erates after Warner-Jenkinson is too powerful a tool and unfairly
shifts the balance of competing interests in the patentee's favor. It
concludes that Congress ideally should codify the doctrine of prosecu-
tion history estoppel, strictly viewing that doctrine's operation as an
absolute bar to expansion of claim limits. Because such congressional
action is unlikely, this Part further argues that the Federal Circuit
should narrowly confine the manner in which a patentee can rebut
the presumption of prosecution history estoppel. To preserve the
public's ability to rely on the public record, such rebuttal attempts
must be bounded by the public record.
I. PATENTS AND INFRINGEMENT
A. Statutory Provisions
The Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress
A15 (noting jury award of $69 million, potentially increasing to $210 million pending motion to
apply royalties for longer period in Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., CV-95-2379 (C.D.
Cal. 1997)).
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of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries."5 A valid patent secures its
owner the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
claimed invention within the United States for twenty years from the
date the patent application is filed in the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice ("PTO").' To be patentable, the invention must possess utility,
novelty, and nonobviousness. 7 To gain exclusionary patent rights, the
applicant must provide a specification describing in detail the best
mode of the claimed product or process, disclosing information suffi-
cient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the inven-
tion, and including one or more claims regarding the subject matter of
the invention.'
The basic policy of the patent system is to grant exclusive rights
to serve the national purpose of advancing the useful arts.9 The grant
of exclusive rights requires disclosing the invention's details, thereby
adding to the store of public knowledge. 10 A patent is thus an in-
ducement to bring forth new knowledge.1'
Patent laws seek a careful balance between protecting a pat-
entee's creative efforts and encouraging further technological ad-
vances through disclosure to the public.12 Unless a patentee's inter-
ests are protected, secrecy and nondisclosure result, which is
detrimental to the public." On the other hand, the statutory claiming
requirement serves a notice function, alerting the public to an inven-
tion's boundaries, past which further innovation is invited.
4
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994) (securing a grant to the patentee "to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States"); id.
§ 154(a)(2) (providing that the grant "shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was
filed").
7. See id. § 101 (providing that a patent may only be secured for one who "invents or dis-
covers any new and useful" product or process); id. § 102 (barring a patent if the subject matter
is in the public domain); id. § 103 (providing that a patent may not be obtained if "the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains").
8. See id. § 112 (providing that specification must detail the invention "in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art.., to make and use the
same," and must conclude with "claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention").
9. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10. See id.
11. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
12. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
13. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
14. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997), see also
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) ("It has long been understood
1998]
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Patent infringement occurs when one "without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention dur-
ing the term of the patent."" The threshold of patent infringement
analysis is interpreting the meaning and scope of the claims. 6 Only
the court interprets claims." The fact-finder then compares properly
construed claims to the accused product or process to yield a deter-
mination regarding infringement. 8
In conducting the infringement analysis, the fact-finder deter-
mines whether either literal infringement or infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents exists. 9 Literal infringement occurs where the
accused product or process falls clearly within a claim's limitations.'
When literal infringement is not established, infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents may occur if the accused product or process
incorporates only insubstantial changes that evade the literal limits of
a claim yet copy the invention's spirit.2'
B. The First Step in Infringement Analysis: Claim Construction
The Supreme Court's recent Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc. decision allocated responsibility for claim construction exclu-
sively to the court.22 In Markman, the Petitioner Markman patented
an inventory control system "capable of monitoring and reporting
upon the status, location and throughput of inventory" in a laundry
that a patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture to 'secure to
[the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is still open to
them."' (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891))).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. 1 1994).
16. See Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 109 F.3d 726, 731 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 624 (1997). Interpreting claim meaning and scope is variously de-
scribed as interpreting claims, see Desper Prods., Inc. v. Q Sound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 1998), construing claims, see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981
(Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), or claim construction, see Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); the result is properly construed claims. See
Lockwood v. American Airlines, 107 F.3d 1565, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
17. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
18. See Tanabe, 109 F.3d at 731.
19. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,607-08 (1950).
20. See id. at 607. The comparison of the interpreted claims and the accused product or
process is made by the jury. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853) (holding that
whether the thing patented has been constructed, used, or sold by the defendant is a question of
fact to be submitted to the jury).
21. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08. Patentees increasingly invoke the doctrine of
equivalents to support infringement allegations. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
22. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
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and dry-cleaning business.23 A keyboard and data processor tracked
"inventory," generating written records which included optical scan-
ner bar codes.24 The Respondent, Westview Instruments, operated
similar equipment to produce written records of customer charges in
bar code format, also read by optical scanner.25
At the district court level, after hearing testimony from the in-
ventor as well as expert witnesses, including a patent lawyer who tes-
tified as to the meaning of the claim language, the jury found in-
fringement. 26  Nevertheless, in ruling on Westview's motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court stated that claim construction
was a matter of law and held that "inventory" as used in the claims
meant "articles of clothing" and not transaction totals or dollars. 7
Because status or location of particular articles of clothing could not
be determined by scanning Westview's barcodes, the district court
granted Westview's motion. The Federal Circuit held that the dis-
trict court acted properly in determining the scope of the claims.29
The Supreme Court affirmed, relying on "functional considera-
tions" to justify making claim construction the exclusive province of
the judge. 0 The Court stated that because judges are trained in and
frequently perform construction of written instruments, they are
more likely than a jury to provide a proper interpretation.31 The
Court did not, however, mandate the procedural structure for judges
to use when conducting claim construction. Rather, Federal Circuit
decisions shaped the so-called "Markman hearing" for patent claim
construction, distinguishing between intrinsic evidence--the words of
the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history--and extrin-
sic evidence-which is anything external to the prosecution history,
such as expert testimony or dictionaries or treatises.32 Analysis of in-
trinsic evidence alone is preferred and is usually sufficient.33 Ideally,
the public must be able to rely on the prosecution history itself, with-
23. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
24. See id. at 971-72.
25. See id. at 972-73.
26. See id. at 973.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 971.
30. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996).
31. See id.
32. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Pall
Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
33. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
19981
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out consideration of expert testimony or other extrinsic evidence, to
determine the true meaning of a claim3 To allow claim meaning to
depend on evidence not available to the public is to erode the notice
function of claims and accord to the patentee rights more expansive
than the PTO intended.35
C. Comparing Claims to the Accused Product or Process:
Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
By comparing properly construed claims to the accused product
or process, it can be determined whether infringement exists, either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement
seldom occurs.36 The judicially-created doctrine of equivalents seeks
to protect a patentee from being subject to "the mercy of verbal-
ism. ' 37 This doctrine is central to the conflict between protecting a
patentee's interests and providing the public with clear notice re-
garding the limits of an invention. Under the doctrine of equivalents,
the scope of a patent goes beyond the literal terms of its claims 38
39
which is at odds with the specificity that patent statutes require.
The doctrine of equivalents poorly defines "equivalent" ele-
ments, ' and its application engenders controversy." The Supreme
Court first addressed the doctrine of equivalents in 1853 in Winans v.
34. See Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
35. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
36. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) ("Out-
right and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement."). Today, as op-
posed to the so-called anti-patent era of the 1930s to 1970s, patents are more likely to be held
valid. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 820-21 (1988) (comparing pre- and post-Federal Circuit era
statistics). Furthermore, it is now relatively easy to get an injunction against an accused in-
fringer. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
12 (2d ed. 1997).
37. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
3& See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing negative aspects of doctrine of
equivalents infringement analysis).
39. See supra note 8 (setting out the requirements for specification).
40. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 ("In determining equivalents, things equal to the
same thing may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes
different may sometimes be equivalents.").
41. Vigorous dissents have accompanied United States Supreme Court and Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit decisions shaping the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Graver
Tank, 339 U.S. at 612 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 618 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 344 (1853) (Campbell, J., joined by Taney, C.J., Ca-
tron, J., and Daniel, J., dissenting); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1536, 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam) (five judges dissenting in three
separate opinions), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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Denmead." In Winans, the patentee invented a conically-tapered
railcar, which simplified coal transportation.43 The patentee alleged
that a competitor's use of an octagonally-tapered railcar constituted
infringement." The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that a patentee
gains protection for "not only the precise forms he has described, but
all other forms which embody his invention. '4 5 The dissent, however,
observed that the patentee claimed a design adopting a conical form
conferring the advantage that the "weight of the load presse[d]
equally in all directions" and that an octagonal profile lacked that key
property. 6 In commenting on the statutory provision requiring a pat-
entee to describe the invention in full, clear, and exact terms, and
specify and point out what is claimed, the dissent stated: "Nothing, in
the administration of this law, will be more mischievous, more pro-
ductive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust
pretensions and vexatious demands, more injurious to labor, than a
relaxation of these wise and salutary requisitions of the act of Con-
gress.,
47
Nearly a century later, the Court again sharply disagreed over
the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co. 41 In Graver Tank, a patentee claimed a sol-
dering flux "containing a major proportion of alkaline earth metal
silicate. 4 9 The accused infringer utilized a metal not classified as al-
kaline earth in the periodic table of elements.0 The Court stated that
to "'prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention' a
patentee may invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] to proceed against
the producer of a device 'if it performs substantially the same func-
tion in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."' 5 ' In
applying the doctrine, the Court upheld the lower court's finding that
the substitution of metals amounted to an "insubstantial difference.,
52
While supporting doctrine of equivalents infringement, however, the
42. 56 U.S. 330 (1853).
43. See id. at 331.
44. See id. at 332.
45. Id. at 342.
46. See id. at 344-45 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
48. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
49. Id. at 613. (Black, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 610.
51. See id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)
(footnote omitted)).
52. Id. at 611-12.
1998]
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Court left uncertain the doctrine's operation by articulating the so-
called "function-way-result" test but applying the so-called "insub-
stantial differences" test.53
The dissent objected that the Court's decision ignored the clear
statutory policy requiring specificity and certainty in claims, stating
that while ".fraud' is bad, 'piracy' is evil, and 'stealing' is reprehensi-
ble... these lofty principles do not justify the Court's sterilization of
Acts of Congress and prior decisions."' The dissent further noted
that:
"The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very pur-
pose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is;
and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to
construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its
terms." Giving this patentee the benefit of a grant that it did not
precisely claim is no less "unjust to the public" and no less an eva-
sion of [the statute] merely because done in the name of the "doc-
trine of equivalents."55
Three limitations confine application of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. These limitations comprise the prior art rule, the all-elements
rule, and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. Though linked
in their nature, each limitation operates differently.
First, the prior art rule states that a patentee cannot gain exclu-
sionary rights not otherwise lawfully obtainable from the PTO. 6 Be-
cause prior art always limits what an inventor can claim, prior art
limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim. 7
Second, the all-elements rule requires that equivalence analysis
proceed on an element-by-element basis. Under this view, since
each element is deemed material to defining the scope of the patent,
equivalence analysis must be applied to the individual elements of the
patent's claims. 9 It is not enough that the accused product or process
is equivalent overall; rather, the accused product or process must pos-
sess every claimed element or its equivalent to constitute infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents °
53. See id. at 608, 610, 611.
54. Id. at 612-13 (Black, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886)).
56. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
57. See id.
58. See Warmer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30 (1997); Penn-
walt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
59. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
60. See id.
[Vol. 73:1393
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Third, and perhaps the most important limitation on the doctrine
of equivalents, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel may pre-
vent a patentee from recovering, through equivalence analysis, sub-
ject matter surrendered by amendment or argument during prosecu-
tion.6 In this instance, a PTO-demanded claim limitation is "very
different" from the same limitation voluntarily included by the appli-
cant;62 the former case limits a patent's scope more conclusively than
the latter.63
D. Prosecution History Estoppel
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel "limits infringement
by otherwise equivalent structures, by barring recapture by the pat-
entee of scope that was surrendered in order to obtain allowance of
the claims."6 Like the doctrine of equivalents, prosecution history
estoppel was judicially-created. This doctrine operates to make
binding a patentee's representations to the PTO during prosecution
regarding the scope of invention and is, therefore, a defense to in-
fringement. 65  Because claims are commonly amended during prose-
66 hcution, prosecution history estoppel touches almost every doctrine
of equivalents infringement analysis.
In an infringement action, the court inspects the prosecution his-
tory to determine whether the patentee, through amendment or ar-
gument, surrendered subject matter.67 If so, the court determines
whether the surrender makes the invention too narrow to support a
patentee's assertion that the accused product or process is substan-
tially the same as the claimed invention. 6' Amendments may be of
61. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1218-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
term "prosecution" encompasses all activity required to advance a patent application to a final
patentability determination by the PTO. See Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d
1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Although secrecy regarding such negotiating activity is maintained
during prosecution, see 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994), the public is allowed access to this information
once the patent issues, see id. § 10.
62. See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942).
63. See id.
64. Pall, 66 F.3d at 1218.
65. See Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136 ("[I]t has long been settled that recourse may not be
had to [the doctrine of equivalents] to recapture claims which the patentee has surrendered by
amendment.").
66. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Comparatively
few claims [are] allowed exactly as originally filed and never amended."), overruled by Nobel-
pharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
67. See Pall, 66 F.3d at 1218-19.
68. See id.
1998]
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different types and may be required for different reasons.69
Seeking uniformity in patent law decisions employing these three
limitations and other patent rules, in 1982 Congress created the Fed-
eral Circuit and conferred upon that court exclusive appellate juris-
diction over patent cases.70 Some cases prior to the Federal Circuit's
advent took the strict view that any limiting amendment barred a pat-
entee from recapturing the surrendered subject matter through
equivalents analysis.7' Other courts preferred examining the reasons
why a patentee yielded to particular PTO demands on the rationale
that a patentee has various motives for amending claims.72 The Fed-
eral Circuit has embraced the latter approach, instituting a reason-
based inquiry to determine whether prosecution history estoppel ap-
plies.73
E. Limiting the Reach of the Doctrine of Equivalents Through
Prosecution History Estoppel
The imprecision inherent in the "insubstantial differences" and
"function-way-result" tests ensures that uncertainty will attach to
every equivalence analysis. " While outright imitation or duplication
of an invention is forbidden, "designing around" a patent is a valued
and encouraged process." An uncertain doctrine of equivalents can
"frustrate[] and chill[]" such design-around efforts by instilling fear of
69. See id at 1219. An "art rejection" results when the PTO relies on prior art in rejecting
the application for lack of novelty under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (b) (1998) or for obviousness un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A "non-art rejec-
tion" results when the PTO rejects the application for some other reason, such as lack of utility
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 or lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. See Rochelle Cooper Drey-
fuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 n.62
(1989).
70. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25, 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
71. See, e.g., Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1978).
72. See, e.g., Coleco Indus., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1257
(C.C.P.A. 1978).
73. See, e.g., Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279,
1285 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
74. See Rudolph P. Hoffman, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of Federal Cir-
cuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1033, 1040
(1994) ("Through the application of the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit has intro-
duced ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the scope of patent claims.").
75. See Joseph F. Haag, Comment, Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co.:
An Equitable Solution to the Uncertainty Behind the Doctrine of Equivalents, 80 MINN. L. REV.
1511, 1525 n.63 (1996) (citing cases which support the proposition that designing-around activi-
ties stimulate innovation and competition).
[Vol. 73:1393
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infringement allegations resting on the doctrine."
Sharp disagreement persists regarding the fairness of the doc-
trine of equivalents. Some commentators argue that the doctrine of
equivalents has improperly become an automatic second step in in-
fringement analysis.77 Other commentators insist that protecting a
patentee's interests requires rote application of the doctrine.78 Justice
Black forecasted that Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co. would create public injustice because equivalence analy-
sis would routinely expand patent claims beyond the plain meaning of
their words.79 Judicial concern continues regarding the doctrine's po-
tential to expand claims8" as well as its erosion of the notice function
of claims.81 Amid this debate arrived a case where resolution de-
pended on whether prosecution history estoppel checked the reach of
the doctrine of equivalents.
76. See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 683 (1989).
77. See, e.g., Clarence J. Fleming, The Doctrine of Equivalents-Should it Be Available in
the Absence of Copying?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 233, 234 (1994) (asserting that
the doctrine of equivalents is a "second bite at the apple for the patent owner in attempting to
prove infringement"); Andrei Iancu, A Two-Track Approach to the Doctrine of Equivalents in
Patent Law: Responding to Hilton Davis, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 325, 334 (1995) (asserting that de-
spite its equitable nature, "infringement by equivalence has become an automatic second prong
to all infringement suits"); Jean M. Barkley, Note, The Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After
Wilson Sporting Goods, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 783 (1993) (arguing that courts should use the
doctrine of equivalents sparingly to prevent it from becoming an automatic second prong in
every infringement case); see also infra note 80 (noting that unbounded doctrine of equivalents
can provide a patantee unwarranted claim scope).
78. See, e.g., Sean T. Moorhead, Note, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-
Literal Infringement or the Second Prong of Patent Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1421, 1449 (1992) ("[T]he definition [of the doctrine of equivalents] is workable and the added
protection for patentees, made possible by the flexibility in the definition, is well worth having
infringement by equivalents as the second prong of every patent infringement charge.").
79. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 615 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the doc-
trine of equivalents does not adequately protect against "retroactive infringement suits and judi-
cial expansion of a monopoly sphere beyond that which a patent authorizes" and will make en-
largement of patent claims the rule rather than the exception).
80. See International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 774 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (Lourie, J., concurring) ("[Tihe doctrine [of equivalents] has its limits, and I believe that a
court must ensure that it achieves its intended purpose and does not simply become an auto-
matic means for expanding the scope of a claim beyond that granted by [PTO] examination.").
81. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Nies,
J., dissenting) ("As a matter of due process under the fifth amendment, reasonable notice must
be given to the public of what conduct must be avoided. Whether in civil or criminal proceed-
ings, it is unequivocally established that that basic right to notice applies."). The court in Lon-
don v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991), stated:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the rule, for if
the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never be
relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every in-
fringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the
claims, then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose.
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II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW: WARNER-JENKINSON CO. V.
HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO.
This Part first discusses the facts of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. It then discusses the Federal Circuit ma-
jority and dissenting opinions below, and then moves to the Supreme
Court opinion. Finally, it discusses the Federal Circuit's decision on
remand.
A. Facts
The patentee, Respondent Hilton Davis Chemical Co., alleged
that a competitor's process for purifying a food dye infringed its pat-
ented process under the doctrine of equivalents.82 The patent de-
scribed an improved purification process utilizing ultrafiltration to
remove impurities from a dye solution.83 The patent recited one in-
dependent claim in Jepson-type format,' describing a process of
passing a reaction mixture through a membrane of preferred pore di-
ameter under a defined pressure range and "at a pH from approxi-
mately 6.0 to 9.0, to thereby cause separation of said impurities from
said dye., 85 Prior to allowance of the patent by the PTO, the patentee
had amended its patent application to include the defined pH range.6
This amendment occurred after the examiner cited a prior art patent
disclosing an ultrafiltration process operating at a pH above 9.0.8
The competitor, Petitioner Warner-Jenkinson Co., operated its ultra-
filtration process at a pH of 5.0, yet Hilton Davis argued the competi-
tive process was nevertheless equivalent to its own patented process. 8
82. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1545 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Lourie, J., dissenting), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
83. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 22 (1997).
84. Jepson-type claims describe improvements over existing prior art. See In re Jepson, 357
F.2d 406, 410 (C.C.P.A. 1966); 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (1997) (requiring for improvement patents
that independent claims be structured to include, in order, a preamble of all known or conven-
tional elements or steps, a transitional phrase such as "wherein the improvement comprises,"
and the elements or steps considered new or improved); see also ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS
ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING §§ 34, 57, 59, 63 (1990) (illustrating various uses
of Jepson-type claims).
85. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 22.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 23.
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B. The Federal Circuit Opinion
1. The Majority Opinion
The jury found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 89
A splintered en banc Federal Circuit narrowly affirmed, holding that
whether infringement exists under the doctrine of equivalents is a
question for the jury.9° The court applied the "insubstantial differ-
ences" test, with the differences between the patented and accused
product or process assessed from the point of view of one having or-
dinary skill in the relevant art.9 The court also held that all evidence
material to the determination of substantiality of differences, includ-
ing that of design-around activity, must be considered.2
The majority held that prosecution estoppel did not preclude the
application of the doctrine of equivalents in the case.93 The court re-
lied on the rule that "[w]henever prosecution history estoppel is in-
voked as a limitation to infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents, a close examination must be made as to, not only what was
surrendered, but also the reason for such a surrender."9 The court
stated that the claim amendment reciting "a pH from approximately
6.0 to 9.0" was made to avoid the prior art, which disclosed an ultrafil-
tration process "operating at a pH higher than 9[.0]." ' The amend-
ment hence "surrendered pHs above 9[.0] but [did] not bar [the pat-
entee] from asserting equivalency to processes such as Warner-
Jenkinson's operating sometimes at a pH below 6[.0]. "96
2. The Dissenting Opinions
Judge Plager dissented, lamenting that "the doctrine of equiva-
lents is a virtually uncontrolled and unreviewable license to juries to
find infringement if they so choose." '9 The dissent further observed
89. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir.
1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
90. See id. at 1520. After a panel of the court heard oral argument, the court decided to
rehear the appeal en banc to consider the issues raised concerning the doctrine of equivalents.
See id. at 1516.
91. See id. at 1518-19.
92. See id. at 1518.
93. See id. at 1525.
94. Id. (quoting Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 703
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1538 (Plager, J., dissenting).
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that juries exercise such a license "largely without regard to and inde-
pendent of the express limitations of the patent claims which may
have brought about their allowance by the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice in the first place."98 Judge Plager noted that the court's own
precedent prohibited "'eras[ing] a plethora of meaningful structural
and functional limitations of the claim on which the public is entitled
to rely."' 99 Though no discussion in the patent explained why the pat-
entee included a lower-end pH of 6.0, this dissent nevertheless argued
that the inventor's own testimony that processes operating at a pH
below 6.0 would cause "tremendous foaming problems in the plant"
showed that Hilton Davis intentionally incorporated the lower pH
limit.0°
Judge Nies also dissented, agreeing that construction of the claim
to cover equivalents is precluded to the extent of a patentee's mani-
fest intent in its representations made to the PTO when securing the
patent grant.01 This dissent stated: "[a] patentee is not entitled, after
patent issuance, to have protection from a claim extend to devices or
processes or elements therein which during prosecution the inventor
treated as a different invention from the one for which the inventor
sought and obtained protection.', 10 2 This dissent pointed not only to
the inventor's testimony regarding undesirable foaming occurring at a
pH less than 6.0, but also to the Examiner's Interview Summary,
which recorded: "The Examiner stated that if claim 1 were amended
to contain the pH range of 6 to 9, the rejection on prior art would be
overcome."'03  Judge Nies flatly concluded that "[t]he specific
amendment of the pH range by Hilton Davis in response to the Ex-
aminer's rejection precludes capturing the different process step of a
pH of 5.0 used by Warner-Jenkinson." 1°' This dissent agreed with
Warner-Jenkinson's contention that it had been held liable without
any possibility of notice that its process fell within the patent claims,
observing that "[c]laims must tell the public not only what it cannot
do but also what it can do."'0' 5
In all, a total of five of twelve judges joined in three separate dis-
98. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting) (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp,.
822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
100. See id. at 1542 (Plager, J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 1572 (Nies, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1581-82 (Nies, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1582 (Nies, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting) (citing Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931)).
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sents." Faced with such deep discord concerning operation of the
doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme Court granted Warner-
Jenkinson's petition for a writ of certiorari.'0 7
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Arguments
Warner-Jenkinson first argued that the doctrine of equivalents as
embraced by the Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co.' was inconsistent with the 1952 Patent Act, which
requires patent claims to express clear boundaries."°9  Warner-
Jenkinson also advanced several secondary arguments, urging the
Court to apply a more restricted doctrine of equivalents.11° Central to
one of these secondary arguments was the contention that the doc-
trine of equivalents is subservient to the doctrine of prosecution his-
tory estoppel, thereby barring equivalence analysis from recapturing
protection for subject matter surrendered by amendment during pat-
ent prosecution.111 Accompanying this secondary argument, Warner-
Jenkinson also argued that: Graver Tank only narrowly established
that an absence of substantial differences is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, element of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents;'12 in
view of the immediately preceding proposition, a court must conduct
an equitable consideration of intent-based elements before permitting
equivalents analysis;"3 and "to minimize conflict with the notice func-
tion of patent claims, the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to
equivalents disclosed within the patent itself.' '14
2. The Holdings
The Court noted that the issue of whether it was for the judge or
jury to apply the doctrine of equivalents was not squarely before it."'
106. See id. at 1536 (Plager, J., dissenting); id. at 1545 (Lourie, J., dissenting); id. at 1550
(Nies, J., dissenting).
107. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 516 U.S. 1145 (1996); see also
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (noting the significant
disagreement within the Federal Circuit as one justification for granting certiorari).
108. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
109. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 25 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605).
110. See id. at 29, 34, 37.
111. See id. at 29.
112. See id. at 34 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605).
113. See id. (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607).
114. Id. at 37.
115. See id.
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Nevertheless, the Court accepted the Federal Circuit's ruling that it
was for the jury to decide whether the accused process was equivalent
to the claimed process."6 Furthermore, the Court refused to require
any "particular linguistic framework" for conducting equivalence
analysis, noting that neither the "function-way-result" test nor the
"insubstantial differences" test had universal utility."7 More substan-
tively, the Court held that the 1952 Patent Act did not reject the doc-
trine of equivalents and that there is a rebuttable presumption that
prosecution history estoppel applies.""
a. The Doctrine of Equivalents Survived the 1952 Patent Act
The Court refused to hold that the 1952 Patent Act rejected the
doctrine of equivalents."9 Warner-Jenkinson contended that the doc-
trine of equivalents was inconsistent with and did not survive the 1952
Patent Act, arguing that: (1) the doctrine of equivalents cannot be
reconciled with the statutory requirement that an invention be
claimed with specificity; (2) the doctrine of equivalents can improp-
erly extend the statutory period within which a patentee can invoke
the patent reissue process to seek an expansion of claims scope; (3) a
court applying the doctrine of equivalents usurps the patent scope de-
termination role reserved for the PTO; and (4) Congress implicitly
rejected general application of the doctrine of equivalents by making
specific mention of a limited form of the doctrine in a statutory
"means-plus-function" claiming provision. 2  The Court rejected the
first three alleged inconsistencies as simply echoes of the arguments
advanced and rejected in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co. 2 ' The Court also concluded that the 1952 Patent
Act was not materially different from the 1870 Act regarding claim-
ing, reissue, and the role of the PTO.'22
116. See id. at 38.
117. See id. at 40.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 27-28.
120. See id. at 25-26. "Means-plus-function" claiming is allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
which states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for per-
forming a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support
thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, mate-
rial, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1998) (emphasis added).
121. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 26-27 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605).
122. See id. at 26 (comparing 35 U.S.C. § 112 with The Consolidation Patent Act of 1870, ch.
230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 112)).
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The Court more carefully evaluated the petitioner's fourth ar-
gument, noting that the 1870 Act did not contain the "means-plus-
function" claiming provision contained in the 1952 Act. 23 This provi-
sion allows a patentee to describe a claim element by the function
served or result accomplished rather than explicitly identifying items
encompassed by the element." Thus, an adhesive for affixing two
surfaces, for example, becomes "a means for affixing the column to
the base," as opposed to "a hot-melt adhesive." The Court, however,
concluded that Congress enacted this provision specifically to over-
turn one of the Court's earlier decisions rejecting claims that "do not
describe the invention but use conveniently functional language at the
exact point of novelty.' ' 125 Observing that this provision was a "tar-
geted cure to a specific problem," and that Congress could easily have
addressed Graver Tank in this same manner, yet did not, the Court
ultimately rejected the notion that Congress implicitly rejected the
doctrine of equivalents through the "means-plus-function" claiming
provision.1
21
b. There is a Rebuttable Presumption of Prosecution History Estoppel
The Court held that there is a rebuttable presumption that
prosecution history estoppel applies. 127  Warner-Jenkinson argued
that the doctrine of equivalents can operate only within the limits de-
fined by the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel . In this view,
because Hilton Davis amended its application to include a claim lim-
iting element of a pH ranging from 6.0 to 9.0, it would be estopped
from later recapturing any of the subject matter surrendered (pH
below 6.0 and above 9.0), even if the surrendered matter was equiva-
lent to the explicitly claimed matter.9 Because the public has no aid
beyond a patent's prosecution record in determining the scope of an
invention, Warner-Jenkinson maintained that the public's right to no-
tice demanded such a rigid application of the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel. "'
123. See id. at 27 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112).
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.. The same portion of the 1952 Act that is quoted by the Court, see
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27, is set out supra in note 120.
125. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27 (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
126. See id. at 28.
127. See id. at 34.
128. See id. at 29.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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While agreeing that prosecution history estoppel could indeed
limit the reach of the doctrine of equivalents, the Court disagreed
that an applicant's reason for making an amendment is irrelevant.
The Court distinguished between amendments made to overcome
prior art and amendments requested by the PTO for "a variety of
other reasons."'32 In the case where an amendment is not made to
overcome prior art, "the change may introduce a new element, but it
does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that
element., 133 The Court, therefore, held that on a case-by-case basis
courts must first probe the reasoning behind an amendment to know
whether prosecution history estoppel bars the application of the doc-
trine of equivalents as to the amended elements.13'
Nevertheless, this conclusion created a problem for the Court
concerning the patent in dispute: nothing in the record documented
the reason for including a lower-bound pH of 6.0.135 Stating that a
holding that "certain reasons for a claim amendment may avoid the
application of prosecution history estoppel" did not necessarily mean
that a patentee offering no reason could avoid such an estoppel, the
Court placed on the patentee the burden of establishing the reason
for a required amendment. 136 Courts must presume that any required
amendment affected patentability until and unless the patentee offers
an "appropriate reason" for the amendment to rebut this presump-
117tion. Here, the Court remanded so that the Federal Circuit could
consider whether the patentee already did, or could, establish that the
reason for the amendment could avoid prosecution history estoppel.38
However, the Court did not specify any procedural structure for ena-
bling a patentee to do so.
c. Other Holdings
Tracing the reasoning and support behind Graver Tank & Manu-
facturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,"' the Court concluded that
application of the doctrine of equivalents is "akin to determining lit-
131. See id. at 31-32.
132. Id. at 31.
133. Id. at 33.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 34.
139. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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eral infringement, and neither requires proof of intent."'40 The Court
thus rejected the Federal Circuit's view that an alleged infringer's ac-
tivity, be it copying a patent or conducting independent investigation,
is reflective of the substantiality of differences between an accused
and a patented product or process."' The Court also rejected the no-
tion that the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to equivalents
known at the time of patent issuance.'42
D. The Federal Circuit's Decision on Remand
Warner-Jenkinson argued that the Federal Circuit could resolve
the case outright due to Hilton Davis's statements made at the vari-
ous oral arguments asserting that there was no reason for that portion
of the claim amendment establishing a lower bound pH.143 The Fed-
eral Circuit declined to view these statements as binding admissions,
concerned that such statements might "merely characterize the state
of the record, not the state of the facts.'
'1 44
The Federal Circuit tersely framed the real issue as whether the
patentee could establish a reason for the amendment unrelated to
patentability, and if so, whether that reason was sufficient to over-
come prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of the doc-
trine of equivalents. 45  The court noted that future disputes over
prosecution history estoppel will benefit from the newly recognized
need to include express recitations of the reasons for requiring or
making claim amendments during patent prosecution. 146 The court,
however, acknowledged Justice Ginsburg's concern that patentees
prosecuting applications prior to Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. might find it difficult to establish an evidentiary
basis for overcoming the new presumption. 47 The court thus con-
cluded that "where the prosecution history is silent or unclear the dis-
trict court should give a patentee the opportunity to establish the rea-
son, if any, for a claim change.' 14' The court, like the Supreme Court,
140. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 35.
141. See id. at 36.
142. See id. at 37.
143. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
144. Id. at 1164.
145. See id. at 1163.
146. See id.
147. See id. (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41
(1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
148. Id.
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did not specify any procedural structure for enabling a patentee to do
so.1"9 The Federal Circuit remanded to the district court, giving that
court discretion to decide "whether hearings are necessary or whether
the issue can adequately be determined on a written record."15
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's creation of a rebuttable presumption that
prosecution history estoppel applies actually weakens, not strength-
ens, the limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. At least three rea-
sons illustrate how the public and the patent bar will find the Court's
ruling unfavorable. First, the outcome of such an inquiry arrives too
late to aid the accused. Second, such an inquiry would increase al-
ready mounting caseload pressures. Third, evidentiary concerns
make questionable the efficacy of such an inquiry. The Court's rule
leaves the balance between protecting a patentee's interests and pro-
viding notice to the public unfairly shifted in the patentee's favor.
Ideally, Congress should modify the statutes governing patent law by
codifying the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel and strictly in-
terpreting that doctrine's operation as an absolute bar to expansion of
claim limits. Because such congressional action is unlikely, the Fed-
eral Circuit should narrowly confine the manner in which a patentee
can rebut the presumption of prosecution history estoppel. To pre-
serve the public's ability to rely on the public record, such rebuttal at-
tempts must be bounded by the public record.
A. Flaws in the Rebuttable Presumption Rule Regarding Prosecution
History Estoppel
Three practical issues expose the flawed reasoning behind the
Court's ruling that there is a rebuttable presumption that prosecution
history estoppel applies. The first and most important issue is that
because the triggering event requiring such a rebuttal will be an in-
fringement suit, its outcome will be valueless to the accused infringer
with respect to aiding his ability to guide pre-litigation conduct. In
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the Court re-
fused to accept the view that the doctrine of equivalents can never be
invoked past the boundaries of prosecution history estoppel, distin-
149. See id. ("We hesitate to specify the procedures that the district court can employ to an-
swer the question posed by the newly created presumption of prosecution history estoppel.").
150. Id. At the time this article was written, the district court had not yet spoken on the
matter.
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guishing between the case of an amendment made because "the claim
as otherwise written [is] viewed as not describing a patentable inven-
tion at all" and the case of an amendment made for one of "a variety
of other reasons why the PTO may request a change in claim lan-
guage."15' Since the patentee had not offered a reason for adding a
lower pH limit, the Court presumed prosecution history estoppel ap-
plied but remanded for a determination of whether the patentee
could establish a reason for amendment sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption.'52 The ambiguous record of the case, however, left the
Federal Circuit unable to determine whether the patentee established
any such reason, prompting remand to the district court.'
The Federal Circuit's difficulties mirror those the public will face
in trying to determine whether a patentee can rebut the presumption
of prosecution history estoppel. A record of litigation constitutes
more than the public will have at its disposal in evaluating patent
scope, yet can nevertheless prove insufficient, as here. Thus, the
public will not be able to make a determination as to whether prose-
cution history estoppel will apply in many cases. The only route to
"sure" knowledge will be an infringement suit. This operates unfairly
because the public's conservative course to avoid an infringement
charge, ironically, will be to presume that prosecution history estop-
pel does not apply, exactly opposite of the Court's rule, and thus to
accord the patentee exclusive rights potentially greater than those in-
tended by the PTO.
The underlying patent policy of furthering technological advance
suffers when the public is driven by uncertainty and fear to accord a
patentee unintended exclusionary rights. The PTO carefully circum-
scribes a patent's claims, granting coverage only for that which is new.
Policy dictates that such exclusionary rights be granted hesitantly, and
then only because society benefits when the patentee's technology
advance enters the public domain following patent expiration. Old
knowledge outside a patent's claims is already in the public domain,
hence the public need not wait to harness it. According a patentee
exclusionary rights wider than those to which he is entitled removes
publicly available knowledge, harmfully curtailing public rights.
151. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31. This division essentially distinguishes between art
and non-art rejections. To support this point, the Court referenced the United States' Amicus
Brief, which argued different treatment should be given to an enablement rejection as opposed
to a prior art rejection. See id.
152. See id. at 34.
153. See Hilton Davis, 114 F.3d at 1163.
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The second troubling issue is that the Court's rule will adversely
impact litigation at the district court level. Many district courts al-
ready have an allergy to patent cases. '54 Unfamiliarity with patent
law, combined with highly technical and often lengthy litigation, can
serve to frustrate district court judges faced with mounting caseload
pressures.
The Warner-Jenkinson decision allowing rebuttal of prosecution
history estoppel increases the burden on district court judges by fa-
voring a "Hilton Davis hearing" whenever prosecution history estop-
pel is an issue. Such a burden, on the coattails of the creation of the
"Markman hearing" on claim construction,'55 further adds to the al-
ready complex course of patent litigation. As at least one commenta-
tor notes, "[t]he 'Markman hearing' approach has the drawback of
adding a mini-trial on claim construction to a litigation procedure in
complex cases that is already time-consuming and expensive for the
litigants and already burdensome for busy district courts with
crowded dockets. ''5 6 In part due to the complexity generated by the
"Markman hearing" mini-trial, on July 1, 1997, California federal
courts adopted detailed rules governing claim construction proceed-
117ings and hearings in patent cases.
If, on remand, the Ohio district court chooses to conduct an
analogous "Hilton Davis hearing" to determine the scope of prosecu-
tion history estoppel, a further mini-trial will be added on top of the
"Markman hearing" mini-trial, itself a recent and potentially unwel-
come addition to trial on the merits.58 Such compounding of litiga-
tion would not be welcomed by judges or the parties who must bear
the financial burden of trial. Litigation costs would soar even higher,
motivating many already fearful of the time and expense involved in
defending a charge of infringement to simply assume that prosecution
history estoppel does not apply, thereby avoiding incremental litiga-
tion costs. Once again, the Court's rule produces unfair results by
allowing a patentee to enjoy protection potentially greater than that
154. See Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent
Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 499, 503 (1997).
155. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
156. George E. Badenoch, Proceeding in the Gray Area After Markman, INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST, June 1996 at 1, 4.
157. See N.D. CAL. Civ. L.R. 16-10 (titled "Claim Construction Proceedings in Patent Cases");
N.D. CAL. Ctv. L.R. 16-11 (titled "Claim Construction Hearings in Patent Cases").
158. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476 n.4 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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intended by the PTO.
The third issue is that a "Hilton Davis hearing" would present
complex logistical and evidentiary issues for courts to resolve. Logis-
tically, since prosecution history is highly relevant to claims construc-
tion,159 a "Hilton Davis hearing" must precede a "Markman hearing"
because only armed with a properly interpreted prosecution history
can a court conduct a proper determination of claims scope.
But the need to conduct a "Hilton Davis hearing" means that the
prosecution history was ambiguous, allowing (indeed, assuring) pres-
entation of extrinsic evidence.'O The kind of extrinsic evidence rele-
vant to a prosecution history hearing is likely to be just the kind of
evidence offered at a claim construction hearing, tempting courts in
the interests of judicial economy to conduct both hearings concur-
rently. As a further complication, extrinsic evidence presented at a
"Hilton Davis hearing" might well aid the jury in determining
equivalents, a factor arguing in favor of jury attendance of at least a
portion of such a hearing. Absent some specific expression of guide-
lines, and faced with the variables of sequential or concurrent hear-
ings and jury presence or absence, district courts are likely to evolve
nonuniform policies both for conducting "Hilton Davis hearings" and
for integrating the same into the already complex course of litigation.
Uncertainty also arises when contemplating the kinds of evi-
dence potentially admissible in a "Hilton Davis hearing." Certainly,
all extrinsic evidence admissible in a "Markman hearing" could prove
useful in a "Hilton Davis hearing" as well; however, the parties may
attempt to offer even more extrinsic evidence at a "Hilton Davis
hearing."
Discussing some of these evidentiary possibilities, however,
demonstrates the minimal efficacy of a "Hilton Davis hearing." For
example, since an amendment that affected patentability would not
allow the patentee to escape prosecution history estoppel, could the
patent examiner be called to testify whether the amendment in ques-
tion affected his or her decision to grant the patent? No. An inquiry
regarding the subjective intent of either the PTO or the applicant is
159. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. Civ. L.R. 16-10 (a)(3), (b)(3) (requiring for claim construction pro-
ceedings that each party point out material contained in the prosecution history it believes sup-
ports its construction of the claim).
160. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997). But
cf. supra note 34 and accompanying text (arguing that the public should be able to rely upon
intrinsic evidence).
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not appropriate or even possible in a patent infringement suit. 6' The
views of the PTO are not obtainable except as reflected in the prose-
cution history.'62 Here, the written record's only indication of the
PTO's views is the ambiguous statement that "if claim 1 were
amended to contain the pH range of 6 to 9, the rejection on prior art
would be overcome. ,163 It is plausible that the applicant's selection of
the lower pH limit satisfied an enablement rejection articulated but
not recorded by the examiner during the interview. Nevertheless, it
now is impossible to explore the issue with the PTO because case law
directs a district court to properly reject any effort to call PTO per-
sonnel to testify.
Since the examiner could never testify, could the other party to a
PTO interview-the applicant's patent attorney or patent agent re-
sponsible for prosecuting the application-testify regarding his or her
recollection of the proceedings? Although a court has discretion to
allow such testimony in a "Markman hearing" on claim construction,
testimony directed to how the patent should be construed is entitled
to no deference. 16' If a court accords little weight to testimony re-
garding the meaning of a claim, even when an existing written record
may support a witness' contention, it is difficult to see how a court
could accept testimony regarding the meaning of an amendment in
the absence of a written record.
Since neither the examiner nor the attorney or agent could be
called, could an inventor offer testimony in a "Hilton Davis hearing"?
An inventor's subjective intent as to claim scope, when unexpressed
in the patent documents, cannot have any effect in a "Markman
hearing."'65 For the same reasons that inventor testimony is rejected
at a "Markman hearing," courts should reject inventor testimony at a
"Hilton Davis hearing." To hold otherwise is unfair to accused in-
fringers "who must be able to rely on the patent documents them-
selves, without consideration of expert opinion that then does not
even exist, in ascertaining the scope of a patentee's right to ex-
161. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
162. See Western Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 432-33 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see
also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1701.01 (6th ed. rev. 1997) (titled "Office
Personnel Not to Testify").
163. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
164. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 983.
165. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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clude." '66 Here, the inventor testified at trial as to his findings, out-
side the PTO's written record, that the purification process func-
tioned down to a pH of 2.167 Even this testimony should have been
disallowed because enablement is determined as of the application
filing date.'6s Declarations dating after an applicant's filing date can
only be used to substantiate doubts pertaining to the accuracy of
statements already in the specification. 169 Here, the specification is
silent on experimentation below a pH of 6.0, and so any assertions on
this issue made after the filing date are inadmissible.
Considering now the party defending against an infringement
charge, an accused infringer can offer evidence at a "Markman hear-
ing"; typically the accused infringer will advance prior art to show
that the product or process obtainable by operating outside the
amended claim limits would not have been patentable. ° Similarly, an
accused may seek the opportunity to offer evidence at a "Hilton
Davis hearing." But in a case like this, where the written record is
ambiguous and no unexamined prior art apparently exists, what
would the accused have to offer? If neither the examiner, attorney,
nor inventor can testify, the accused has no need to offer impeach-
ment evidence. With the particular facts of this case, the patentee's
testimony regarding experimentation below a pH of 6 might actually
aid the accused: if experiments post-dating the amendment were the
first point in time the patentee discovered the process would work at
a pH below 6, the accused could argue the inference that there was no
reason prompting the earlier selection of the lower pH limit. In most
instances, however, the accused will not possess such information.
The very ambiguity triggering the need for a "Hilton Davis hearing"
leaves the accused with little or no useful evidence to offer on its be-
half.
This discussion illustrates the difficulties courts, the patent bar,
the parties, and the public may experience with the "Hilton Davis
hearing" that may arise from the Court's creation of a rebuttable pre-
sumption of prosecution history estoppel. Evidence at such a hearing
would be extremely limited, rendering questionable whether a "Hil-
166. Id.
167. See Oral Argument of David E. Schmidt on Behalf of the Respondent, Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (No. 95-728), available in 1996 WL
593639, at *31 (Oct. 15, 1996).
168. See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
169. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
170. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
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ton Davis hearing" would have any utility whatsoever.
Though a ruling placing on the patentee the burden of rebutting
a presumption of prosecution history estoppel seems to operate
against the patentee, the public, driven by uncertainty and a desire to
minimize potential litigation costs, will presume in the many ambigu-
ous cases that prosecution history estoppel does not apply. This
likely result essentially eliminates one of the few defenses to a charge
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, leaving the balance
between protecting a patentee's interests and providing notice to the
public unfairly shifted in the patentee's favor. The additional trou-
bling issues of nonuniform litigation procedures, logistics, and admis-
sibility of evidence further demonstrate the negative implications of
the Court's ruling.
B. Prosecution History Estoppel Should be Strictly Applied
Despite the Court's confident assertion that a rebuttable pre-
sumption of prosecution history estoppel "places reasonable limits on
the doctrine of equivalents" and "gives proper deference to the role
of claims in defining an invention and providing public notice,' ' 1 such
a rule creates more confusion for the public than ever before. Just as
the Petitioner in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
argued, the better rule is to strictly apply the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel to any subject matter an amendment surrenders
during patent prosecution because inquiry into the reasons for such a
surrender undermines public notice. 72 The Court rejected this posi-
tion, collecting cases in which prosecution history estoppel was not
invoked until after judicial scrutiny of the reason a required amend-
ment was made.'73 But the Court simply documented a history of
such scrutinization and never addressed the real issue that such an in-
quiry conflicts with the public's right to notice of the boundaries of an
invention.
Clear notice demands strict application of the doctrine of prose-
cution history estoppel. As the American Intellectual Property Law
Association noted, "To the extent the clear literal boundaries of the
claims are made fluid and subject to a broadening interpretation in
litigation, it becomes commensurately more difficult for the public to
171. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
172. See id. at 30.
173. See id. at 31 n.5.
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know what infringes and what does not. ' 174 The doctrine of equiva-
lents has already eroded notice, and the Court's rebuttable presump-
tion of prosecution history estoppel risks etching notice further.
Judicially created doctrines must be subservient to the clear and
unambiguous language of relevant statutes. Here, the patent statutes
state absolutely that specificity is required.175 Specificity gives public
notice. The Court's rule should have been that an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of prosecution history estoppel exists whenever amend-
ments are made, providing clear notice to the public as to what can
and cannot be practiced.
The Court's ruling will likely chill future technology growth in
areas such as microelectronics, biotechnology, telecommunications,
and computers due to greater unpredictability of liability for patent
infringement. Companies are already being advised to raise insur-
ance coverage due to the uncertainties accompanying jury determina-
tions of infringement.
1 76
Examining, for example, the new and highly competitive field of
biotechnology, enormous investments are presently being made
seeking technological innovation.1 77 The benefits to society of such
spending are manifest in the creation of patented drugs treating dis-
eases such as AIDS, cancer, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibro-
sis, and many others.17 ' However, new competitors will find it difficult
to attract start-up capital from investors leery of both the inability to
predict outcomes in patent infringement cases and the possibility that
one adverse infringement judgment could bankrupt the fledgling
company. Technology improvements will slow, not only due to a lack
of new players in the industry but also because existing companies
will be reluctant to invest in competitors' research areas due to uncer-
tainty regarding patent scope. Society thus risks technological stagna-
tion, precisely opposite the patent statutes' intent.
A robust doctrine of prosecution history estoppel that can effec-
174. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of
Neither Party, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (No. 95-
728), available in 1996 WL 170149, at *7 (Apr. 11, 1996).
175. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
176. See Timothy L. Swabb, Federal Circuit Cannot Stop Runaway Jury Awards in Patent
Suits, 3 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Pat. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) 11, 13-14 (Sept. 1995).
177. See, e.g., Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (No. 95-728),
available in 1996 WL 249509, at *2 (May, 13, 1996) (noting that biotechnology industry as a
whole invested $7.7 billion on research and development and production facilities in 1995).
178. See id.
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tively brake the largely unchecked doctrine of equivalents can reduce
this risk. The Supreme Court has refused to interpret prosecution
history estoppel strictly. Ideally, Congress should modify the statutes
governing patent law by codifying the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel and strictly interpreting that doctrine's operation as an ab-
solute bar to expansion of claim limits.
Because such congressional action is unlikely, the Federal Circuit
should narrowly confine the manner in which a patentee can rebut
the presumption of prosecution history estoppel. To preserve the
public's ability to rely on the public record, such rebuttal attempts
must be bounded by the public record. In disputes involving patents
prosecuted before Warner-Jenkinson, where the need for explicit
memorialization was not yet identified, the Federal Circuit should
strictly limit the types of extrinsic evidence admissible in rebutting the
presumption of prosecution history estoppel. To ensure proper no-
tice, courts should consider only evidence publicly available prior to
an infringement suit. In disputes involving patents prosecuted after
Warner-Jenkinson, where patentees are aware of the need to rigor-
ously document in the record the reasons for any amendment, the
court should not allow extrinsic evidence to have any bearing on such
a rebuttal attempt.
CONCLUSION
Many hoped Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
would resolve the debate about the doctrine of equivalents' potential
to expand patent scope, thereby eroding the notice function of claims.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, operation of the doctrine
seemed increasingly uncontrollable. The Supreme Court's decision
creating a rebuttable presumption of prosecution history estoppel
weakens one of the few defenses to a charge of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents and assures confusion will continue to
reign in patent litigation. Conducting a "Hilton Davis hearing" to in-
terpret an ambiguous prosecution history is a complex, expensive,
and ultimately unavailing activity. The Court's rule regarding prose-
cution history estoppel unfairly shifts toward the patentee the balance
between protecting a patentee's interests and providing notice to the
public. To correct this, and to prevent chilling of future technology
growth, Congress ideally should modify the statutes governing patent
law to reflect a strict interpretation that prosecution history estoppel
is an absolute bar to expansion of claim limits. Because such congres-
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sional action is unlikely, the Federal Circuit should narrowly confine
the manner in which a patentee can rebut the presumption of prose-
cution history estoppel. To preserve the public's ability to rely on the
public record, such rebuttal attempts must be bounded by the public
record.

